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BOOK REVIEW
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY. R. Kent Newmyer. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1985. Pp. xvii, 490.
$33.00. (Studies in Legal History).
Joseph Story is one of those historical figures who stand astride
a nation or a period, whose energy exhausts and amazes but who
ultimately cannot be said to be as significant as their lives initially
suggest. Cotton Mather, Richard Hooker, the English theologian,
and Roscoe Pound are similar figures. Nevertheless, the life of a
figure, like Joseph Story, fascinates because it provides a vantage
point on the history of his particular epoch. Because of this, it is
surprising that we have had to wait until now for the first major bi-
ography of Joseph Story.1
Kent Newmyer has crafted a tightly organized 2 biography of
sensible length that examines Story's life and epoch very well. He
integrates well the complexities of the early republican period with
Story's life. Legal cases and materials are dealt with carefully and
accurately; the discussion of Swift v. Tyson 3 is the best available. 4
I R.K. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURTJUSTICE JOSEPH STORY (1985) [hereinafter cited
as NEWMYER]. There is another full-length modem biography. G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JO-
SEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1970). It does a good job of drawing
together most of the materials on Story's life but does not investigate in depth Story's
intellectual contributions. James McClellan attempted an intellectual study in JOSEPH
STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THOUGHT
WITH SELECTED WRITINGS (1971). On McClellan see Dowd, Book Review, 72 COLUM. L.
REV. 954 (1972).
2 The indices to this volume are excellent. The topical index is thorough and well
laid out, particularly in its functional subheadings under the entry for Story himself.
The case index is very helpful. The gathering of the footnotes at the end did not bother
me because few of them were textual and because I moved a book mark along to consult
them as I read.
3 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
4 See NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 334-43. I am aware of three other major attempts
to describe this seminal case. First, Morton Horwitz places it in the context of his trans-
formation thesis, and to the extent one thinks that there was a transformation in Ameri-
can law, then Swift was part of it. M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860 (1977). Second, Randall Bridwell, at first in his book, written with Ralph U.
Whitten, and later in a long and sharply worded review of the Horwitz book, has offered
a neo-Hayekian interpretation of the case and much else. R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITrEN,
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARA-
TION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM (1977); Bridwell, Theme v. Reality in American Legal His-
tory: A Commentary on Horowitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, and on
the Common Law in America, 53 IND. L.J. 449 (1978). For a thoughtful review of the
Bridwell and Whitten book, see Ely, Book Review, 53 IND. L.J. 277 (1977). Third, Mark
Tushnet, in a note written while a law student, placed Swift in the context of efforts by
lawyers, including Story, to resist the popular aspects of the codification movement and
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Newmyer's discussion (pp. 370-75) of Story's opinion in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania5 effectively refutes Robert Cover's argument that the
opinion reflected the peculiar strain on antislavery jurisprudence
and judges in 18416 and suggests instead that Prigg is consistent
with Story's view of the inescapable aspects of the Constitution's
slavery compromise. Every United States constitutional law profes-
sor, legal historian, and general historian should read this solid
work carefully.
Unlike much recent United States legal history, this is a gentle
book. Newmyer is deferential to other scholars even when he dis-
agrees with them, for instance, with Robert Cover and Morton Hor-
witz. 7 Conclusions are not overstated; the book does not go farther
than the carefully marshalled evidence. Perhaps this gentleness will
give rise to criticism from others, but this reviewer finds it a particu-
lar attraction of the book, one that will make the book more durable
than other more argumentative historical works. The rest of this
review is, therefore, not offered as criticism but rather as thoughts
or speculations engendered by reading Kent Newmyer's fine book.
I
THE STATUS OF STORY'S FAMILY
Kent Newmyer describes Story and his family as part of the
"Marblehead aristocracy" (p. 7). He points out, however, that
Story's physician father, Elisha, begat at least eighteen children by
his two wives and that Story's mother, the second wife, took care of
the household chores without any servants until after the Revolution
(p. 10). Although Elisha Story was a physician, this by no means
implies the high economic or social status that characterizes twenti-
eth century medical practice.8 Elisha Story's brother, Isaac, was the
also in the context of Perry Miller's view that the first part of the nineteenth century was
a conflict between Mind and Heart. Note, Swift v. Tyson Exhumed, 79 YALE LJ. 284
(1969).
5 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
6 R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
7 For instance, he cites Robert Cover's comments when he finds himself in agree-
ment with Cover, e.g., NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 349-50, but when he disagrees, as in his
exegesis of Prgg, he does not set out and confront the disagreement. In the Prigg discus-
sion the main reference to Cover that I have found is in footnote 102, supporting page
373 of the text. In the text Newmyer states, "Possibly Prigg was like Amistad or the Creole
mutiny affair, in which the law permitted judges to discover what they wanted to find (in
Story's case a loophole for freedom) .... " Id. at 373. This is fundamentally at variance
with Cover's version of that case, and yet in footnote 102 Newmyer states, "This is the
theme of Cover,Justice Accused, which treats Story's decisions on slavery with insight." Id.
at 447 n.102.
8 See Osgood,John Clark, Esq., Justice of the Peace, 1667-1728, in 62 LAW IN COLONIAL
MASSACHUswrrs, 1630-1800, at 107-11 (Pub. Colonial Soc'y Mass. 1984); MEDICINE IN
COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1620-1820 passim (Pub. Colonial Soc'y Mass. 1980).
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Calvinist minister of the Second Church in Marblehead, and both of
his fathers-in-law were substantial figures in Marblehead.
Kent Newmyer's data is accurate, but I think it misses a crucial
point. Story saw himself, largely because of his origins, as a nonaris-
tocrat in Massachusetts society. His isolation at Harvard College (p.
23) and his life-long unctuousness and toadying to people of higher
social status make no sense unless one understands that Joseph
Story felt very deeply that he was not of high social status. Even
granting that nineteenth century discourse was fawning in tone,
Story's pronouncements were more than normally self-abasing.
I think Story viewed himself as coming from a solid family that
was modest in social attainments, dwelling in a small, provincial
town, Marblehead.9 His striving for wealth and respectability dur-
ing the rest of his life becomes inexplicable if one accepts without
some further elaboration Kent Newmyer's explanation of his social
origins. Undoubtedly, Story's sense of his social status affected his
political and intellectual views, as discussed below.
II
STORY'S PERSONALITY
Kent Newmyer adds little to our understanding of Story's per-
sonality, a subject of interest to many who have dealt with aspects of
his life. I am not suggesting that Newmyer should have engaged in
psychohistory, but I had hoped that he would shed new light on
Story's persona.
For instance, Newmyer points out that Story tended to push
ideas to extremes (p. 350). This contrasts with John Marshall who,
as Newmyer suggests, could recognize "brick-walls" and knew how
to avoid them. Similarly, Story's fingers were in many pies; he
taught law, he was the president of a bank (p. 326), he rode circuit,
he did more than his share of the Supreme Court's work, he advised
Daniel Webster on cases (pp. 175-77) and conservative Massachu-
setts politicians on tactics (pp. 162-63).
Story also switched his political affiliation from Republican to
proto-Whig. Newmyer ties this evolution to Story's enduring affilia-
tion to the ideas of the "old republic," 10 the conservative, Burkean
ideals of the revolutionary epoch. Although this rationale seems
9 See I LIFE AND LETrERS OFJOSEPH STORY 30-34 (W.W. Story ed. 1851).
10 I am aware that this is a well-developed theme in general American historiogra-
phy, e.g., that there was a group of ideas called "republicanism" which were in conflict
with the democratic thrusts represented for the most part by Andrew Jackson. See M.
HOLT, THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF THE 1850s (1978); L. KERBER, FEDERALISTS IN DISSENT
(1970). 1 remain unsure that this label is very helpful in understanding anything more
than a generational and sectional tendency against Jacksonianism.
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certain and is particularly well demonstrated by Story's willingness
to abide by the constitutional settlement of the slavery issue, it is
hard to square with Story's ability to adapt in other areas, such as his
evolving sense of what the commercial classes needed.
Is there some explanation for Story's intellectual compulsive-
ness, his desire to work constantly, and his political change?
Newmyer is surely correct that Story was a man of the old republic;
by the end of his tenure on the Supreme Court Story felt that he was
the beleaguered defender of the Constitution. But beyond this, one
has to believe that other things were at work in Story's life. Was the
mid-life career change of his son, William, from lawyer to sculptor
an indication that Story's activities as a jurist never satisfied his po-
etic or romantic side (p. 197), which he pushed aside after an initial
critical rejection? Deep questions about the personality of a famous
person can rarely be answered satisfactorily, but a major biography
should confront them. The questions become at least a framework
from which to look at the professional aspects of the person's life.
Perhaps the explanation for why so little of what Story did has
born further professional fruit is that his work reflected a deep per-
sonality ambivalence or schism. Newmyer tantalizes with some hints.
"Shades of Cotton Mather!" he notes of Story at one point (p. 186).
The personality resemblances are indeed strong. On the other
hand, Story's humane side, unlike Mather's, comes through in his
family life which, even though it was not an everyday aspect of his
existence because of his frequent travels and his wife's invalidism,
was happy (p. 221). If Story was a pedant, Mather was a pedant's
pedant. Story's second wife, Sarah Wetmore, found Mather "incor-
rigibly dull & credulous" (p. 178).
In contrast to Kent Newmyer's cautiousness, I want to advance
the thesis that Story's personality quirks, political views, and combi-
nation of scholarly productivity and lack of coherence, discussed be-
low, resulted from his sense of social inferiority. It is hard to make
sense of his revulsion at Jacksonianism, his flirtation with and later
rejection of Republicanism, and his lifelong dedication to the facili-
tation of commerce by the law without understanding him and his
ambitions in the context of the Massachusetts social order.
III
STORY THE THEORIST
It is difficult to embark on a major inquiry into Story's theory of
law because he did not view himself as a theorist. Story was inter-
ested in practical, scientific law. But he did write a fair amount of
what we might call jurisprudence. He believed in natural law (p.
170). He thought law could and should be scientific (pp. 277, 285,
1986] 729
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
& 303). He believed in the wisdom and relevance of the common
law residuum, at least as a starting point, for developing American
law. Although he thought very highly ofJohn Marshall, Lord Mans-
field, the great common law judge, was his hero (p. 246). He
thought that the law was and should be moral (p. 211). He cited,
not as authority, but as sources of wisdom and insight, the works
available to him by the civilians (p. 287).
What did Story mean by natural law? What made law scientific?
Was the use of such terms merely a ruse, designed to emphasize that
society needed lawyers at its very center to guide it andJoseph Story
at the center of the center to train and guide the lawyers? What of
the relationship of religion to law, which Story occasionally stressed
(pp. 183, 184, & 244)?
Kent Newmyer deftly reveals that the foregoing are issues. He
also makes an effort to place Story in the intellectual milieu of his
age. Story was an active Unitarian (p. 180), and intellectually he re-
sembled his Harvard classmate, William Ellery Channing," the
great pre-transcendentalist, Unitarian divine. For Story and for
Channing, if the latter ever used the concept, natural law was a set
of possible legal choices that was consistent with their views as to
the perfectability of mankind. The world was an imperfect creation,
but it lacked the active, evil force that the New Lights 12 and their
predecessors, the Puritans, saw. So defined, Story's natural law pro-
vided few specific answers to particular questions but was rather an
affirmation of a framework of rationality for answering those
questions.
Story was not above using the words "natural law" to suggest
their ancient meaning, i.e., a set of derivable and unchangeable
moral truths revealed to man but perhaps not rationally deducible.
Story vigorously affirmed the proposition that slavery was a moral
wrong.' 3 That it was not consistent with natural law is another
proposition he probably accepted. But Story, like most modem
legal theorists, did not feel that law which failed to intersect with
morality ceased to be law. Slavery could be maintained as a matter
of municipal law.
S1I For work on this important figure in American religious history, see D.P. EDGELL,
WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT (1955); A. DELBANCO, WILLIAM
ELLERY CHANNING: AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERAL SPIRIT IN AMERICA (1981).
12 For a Otiscussion of the conflict between the New Lights, evangelicals of the late
eighteenth century, and the Old Lights, see C.C. GOEN, REVIVALISM AND SEPARATISM IN
NEW ENGLAND, 1740-1800: STRICT CONGREGATIONALISTS AND SEPARATE BAPTISTS IN THE
GREAT AWAKENING (1962); A. HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND: FROM THE
GREAT AWAKENING TO THE REVOLUTION (1966).




For Story the most important concept was his belief that law
had to be scientific. This statement, no doubt, meant a number of
things, even to Story. It conveyed his belief that law was a precise
science and provided specific answers to questions. Law was exact
and exacting. It also meant that scientists, experts, were needed. A
sick patient required a physician; an unpaid creditor required an in-
telligent attorney who, in turn, required the authority and proce-
dures of the law. Finally, law was scientific in that it was rational, it
made logical sense, at least it did to Joseph Story once he had fig-
ured it out.
It would, however, be a mistake to portray Joseph Story as a
pure rationalist, a cold Aristotelian without a cosmology. He was a
man of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and in
those eras the language of the past obfuscated changed and chang-
ing perceptions. His unflagging zeal for the entire common law sys-
tem, including its sister branch, equity, demonstrates that he carried
with him a tremendous amount of historical baggage. But, as
Newmyer lucidly shows, even Story was willing to contemplate lim-
ited codification and other changes and evolution in the common
law (p. 279).
IV
STORY THE LEGAL FIGURE
Story loved the action associated with the law. He loved sitting
as a circuit judge. Kent Newmyer makes the reader feel how excited
Story was to breeze into Providence or Wiscasset, as the circuit
judge, impatiently imparting knowledge to the far corners of the
New England legal community. Newmyer also conveys, as no one
else has done before, the extent of Story's devotion to teaching and
to Harvard. Teaching was no minor corner of his career. It was a
source of immense satisfaction to him to teach, even if he was gassy,
as some jealous colleagues and a few students asserted.
But what to make of Story's intellectual contribution to the law?
He wrote a large, but not immense, corpus of federal decisions. His
treatises covered a good shelf in a library and dealt competently
with most of commercial law, plus constitutional law, conflicts,
pleading, and equity. Kent Newmyer succinctly evaluates these trea-
tises (pp. 281-89). Conflict of Laws was the most original. Equity Juris-
prudence probably has had the greatest impact. His Commentaries on the
Constitution, although it continues to draw attention,' 4 is perhaps the
14 The author of the most recent discussion of the constitutional law treatise does
not disagree in any substantial way with what Newmyer has to say, although neither
seems to have read the other's manuscript. See Powell,Joseph Story's Commentaries on the
Constitution: A Belated Review, 94 YALE LJ. 1285 (1985).
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most argumentative. But it is hard to find a theme that runs through
these treatises.
Story's opinions also present a series of pictures that do not
seem to reflect any single motif. There is the securing and protec-
tion of the Marshallian legacy in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.15 One
finds a continuing advancement of general, knowable commercial
rules; Swift v. Tyson 16 is the most famous opinion. Conversely, he
conceived of property rights in fairly static terms, as shown in his
dissent in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.17
Lest anyone think that Story was the spokesman merely of his
region and time, a number of his decisions cut against both. At
great risk he opposed sectional sentiment on the War of 1812 and
the embargo of 1807 (pp. 58-60, 83-90). He resisted abolitionist
demands (pp. 307, 365-78). He favored balancing the interests of
seamen, masters and shipowners in admiralty (pp. 151-53). But
even these contrarities have no theme. For in most matters Story
reflected the aspirations and interests of the dominant culture of
New England.
Perhaps the answer to the questions implicitly posed here, what
motivated and explains Joseph Story, is that there are for many
humans, with their complexities, no simple ideologies that they hold
on to or that unlock the mystery of their lives. Rather, they meld the
passions and interests of their ideals, their society, their social situa-
tion and ambitions, and the peculiar twists and turns of their own
lives' paths. It is also possible that such intellectual diffuseness is
desirable. How could an adherent of a more rigid and authoritarian
legal system, like the civil law, ever have elaborated, as Story did in
his treatise, the notion of dual sovereignty in which the states and
federal government not only end up with less power than a unitary
state but as contenders for the favor of the people?
Russell K. Osgood*
15 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
16 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
17 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
* Professor of Law, Cornell University, and Editor, Law and Histoty Review. The
author wishes to thank Gregory Alexander, Dennis J. Hutchinson, and MarkJ. Solomon
for reading drafts of this review.
732 [Vol. 71:726
